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Introduction 
 The 2004 Presidential Election was a record breaking and controversial affair for the 
State of Ohio. Ohio’s 20 Electoral College votes made the State a battleground. The campaigns 
of both incumbent President George W. Bush and Democrat Presidential candidate Senator John 
Kerry spent a lot of time and resources in their efforts to win in Ohio.  There was also an 
important citizen’s initiative on the ballot. Issue 1 would define marriage as between a man and a 
woman. It was placed on the ballot by the Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage, an organization 
funded mainly by the Ohio affiliate of Focus on the Family, a leading nationwide conservative 
organization. Ohio was not the only state to have such an initiative on their ballot in November 
2004. The states of Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Utah all had anti-same-sex marriage amendments on their 
ballot and these amendments passed in all 11 states.  
The combination of factors leading up to the 2004 Presidential Election causes us to ask, 
did Issue 1 have any impact on the results of the 2004 Presidential Election in Ohio? This paper 
hypothesizes that Issue I had an effect on the results of the 2004 Presidential election in Ohio. 
We must look at several important areas in order to fully understand this issue. First we must 
understand the Democratic Party’s relationship to the issue of same-sex marriage. We will then 
examine President Bush’s relationship with the Evangelical community. Next we will explore 
the issue of same-sex marriage itself, and then delve into why the issue was especially pertinent 
in Ohio in 2004. Ohio, as a battleground, was especially vulnerable to issues like same-sex 
marriage. It is important for us to understand how the Issue 1 campaign was able to exploit these 
vulnerabilities. Finally, we will directly address the results of the presidential election in Ohio 
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and the impact of election irregularities. Exploring these crucial areas will allow us to see that 
Issue 1 did have an impact on the results of the 2004 Presidential election.  
 
Methods 
 It is important to examine several different sources of information in order to get the most 
complete, accurate picture of the 2004 Presidential election in Ohio. Specifically, this paper 
critically analyzes newspaper articles from before and directly after the 2004 Presidential 
Election, Gallup Polls, National Election Pool exit poll results from the nation and Ohio, and raw 
election return data from the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office. The paper also includes 
information from and analysis of scholarly articles and pertinent books.  
 
Same-Sex Marriage and the Democratic Party 
Same-sex marriage caused tension amongst two important groups within the Democratic 
Party; the African-American community and the lesbian, gay, transgender and bisexual (LGBT) 
community. Examining how these two groups interact with the issue of same-sex marriage will 
help us to understand how a Democratic response to the Bush campaign could cause problems 
for the Kerry campaign.  
Senator Kerry did not craft a response to President Bush’s February 24, 2004 statement 
on same-sex marriage for almost two full weeks. Kerry announced his complete position on the 
issue while on a campaign stop in Toledo. His position had two parts: first, he believed that the 
issue should be decided by individual states instead of the federal government; second, he 
believed that same-sex marriage should not be legalized, instead advocating for the creation of 
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civil unions which would provide similar legal status as marriage.
1
 Serving in the United States 
Senate since 1984, Kerry had quite an extensive record on the issue of LGBT rights. He voted 
against the Federal Defense of Marriage Act in 1996, and has advocated for the rights of the 
LGBT community by supporting legislation such as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 
hate crimes legislation, the repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, and the Early 
Treatment of HIV Act. Yet when asked about an amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution 
which would outlaw gay marriage he maintained that marriage should be defined as between a 
man and a woman.
2
   
This position saw a mixed reaction from the LGBT community. The National Stonewall 
Democrats denounced the decision,
3
 while the Human Rights Campaign acknowledged that 
Kerry would still be an advocate for LGBT rights regardless of the nuance of his position on gay 
marriage.
4
 Kerry’s difficulty defining his position illustrated an ongoing problem with his 
campaign; voters wanted a candidate who took a clear stance on the issues. A Pew Research 
Center poll found that only seven percent of voters voted for him compared to 27 percent of 
Bush voters because of a strong stance on the issues.
5
  
The LGBT community has also become a cornerstone of the Democratic Party’s voting 
bloc, especially important to recent fundraising. The Gill Foundation, a non-profit organization 
that funds civil rights efforts for the LGBT community, found that 92 percent of eligible, self-
identified gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered voters were registered and 52 percent had 
voted in the 2000 Presidential Election.
6
 The LGBT community has traditionally voted with the 
                                                 
1
 (Healy & Phillips, 2004) 
2
 (Graham, 2004) 
3
 (Kuhr, 2005) 
4
 (Farhi, 2004) 
5
 (The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2004) 
6
 (Graham, 2004) 
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Democratic Party 70 to 75 percent of the time, making them an incredibly reliable voting bloc.
7
 
Before the 2004 election, The Advocate estimated that there would be approximately 4 million 
LGBT voters, an impressive number especially in an election that was already seen as very 
close.
8
 
In the past ten years, the LGBT community has strengthened its political voice through 
fundraising and campaign contributions. The contribution power of the LGBT community has 
been growing steadily for the past ten years. In 1996, the Human Rights Campaign donated 
approximately $1.5 million to Congressional candidates, almost exclusively to Democrats. This 
is a significant change from twenty five years ago, when politicians would often return 
contributions from known members of the LGBT community.
9
 
The African-American community has voted overwhelmingly Democratic since the 1965 
passage of the Voting Rights Act under Democratic President Lyndon Johnson. Though a 
minority, African-Americans have voted for the Democratic Party in Presidential elections 85 to 
95 percent of the time since 1992.
10
 Integral to the politics of the African American community 
is the church. The “black church” has served as a central organization point for the African 
American community.
11
 Research indicates that just looking at race is a poor predictor of 
attitudes on homosexuality. Instead, it is important to understand the extent of an individual’s 
religiousness to predict how they feel about homosexuality. African-Americans who identified 
themselves as attending church regularly were likely to have similar attitudes towards 
homosexuality as whites who identified themselves as attending church regularly.
12
 In fact, 
                                                 
7
 (Keen, 2008) 
8
 (Graham, 2004)  
9
 (Campbell & Davidson, 2000) 
10
 (Bositis, 2008) 
11
 (Schulte & Battle, 2004) 
12
 (Schulte & Battle, 2004) 
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African-American evangelicals are likely to have the same views as white evangelicals towards 
moral and culturally issues, but disagree on the role that the government should play in their 
lives.
13
 
Yet these shared cultural and moral beliefs do not frequently translate into similar 
political action. As a result, the African-American religious community has become a target for 
the Christian Right.
14
 Issue 1 became an opportunity for the Christian Right to engage the 
African-American religious community in Ohio. A study of the attitudes of the Columbus area 
religious community towards Issue 1 found that organizations mobilized in support of Issue 1 
were much more active in contacting all churches in the area, with a particular focus on African-
American churches. The study found that 70 percent of predominately African-American 
churches sampled had been contacted by or had heard of the Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage, 
the leading proponent of Issue 1, compared to Ohioans Protecting the Constitution, the leading 
opponent of Issue 1, which had only contacted 11.1 percent of those same African-American 
churches sampled.
15
  
Several leaders in Cleveland’s African-American religious community made clear their 
support for Issue 1, going so far as to hold a press conference announcing their support for the 
Issue.
16
 The study of Columbus area churches also found that “Black Protestant” clergy was the 
second most likely to engage their congregation in conversations regarding Issue 1.
17
 It is unclear 
whether this support translated into support for the Republican Party. We will discuss this further 
when looking at statewide vote totals.  
 
                                                 
13 (Calhoun-Brown, 1997) 
14
 (Calhoun-Brown, 1997) 
15
 (Djupe, Neiheisel, & Sokhey, 2007) 
16
 (Tinsley, 2004) 
17
 (Djupe, Neiheisel, & Sokhey, 2007) 
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President Bush and the Evangelical Community 
The evangelical community was an important element of the Bush base in 2000. Bush’s 
political upbringing in Texas had shown him the importance of using religion to connect with 
people on the campaign trail.
18
 He had wooed the evangelical community in 2000 by being 
incredibly open about his faith. As a born-again Christian, Bush the candidate was able to speak 
directly to the faith community, something that no candidate or President had been able to do 
since Jimmy Carter. As a result, Bush became a de facto leader of the Christian Conservative 
Right.
19
 Yet the 2000 campaign failed to turn out as many Evangelical voters as had been 
expected. Bush advisor Karl Rove estimates that of the approximately 19 million evangelical 
voters, only 15 million voted in the 2000 election.
20
 These sidelined voters represented an 
opportunity for the Bush campaign to gain more votes without drastically changing their 
message.  
The challenge for President Bush was finding a way to speak to the Christian Right 
without alienating less conservative Republican voters and independents. Using biblical 
language to describe the importance of passing a constitutional amendment banning gay 
marriage had the potential to start a culture war and result in a backlash against the Bush 
campaign.
21
 It also had the potential to anger the more moderate, fiscal conservatives, who tend 
to focus more on business issues. This required the Bush campaign to find a way to speak to their 
base without scaring the rest of the country. They had been able to do this by invoking the idea 
of “compassionate conservatism.” Bush began using the idea of compassionate conservatism in 
                                                 
18
 (Burack, 2008)  pg. xiv 
19
 (Milbank, 2001) 
20
 (Mitchell, 2007) 
21
 (Foer, 2004) 
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1998, while Governor of Texas. The concept of compassionate conservatism allows conservative 
politicians to tackle social issues by applying traditional conservative values.
22
 
Leaders of the Christian Right have, over time, developed a method of speaking 
differently for different audiences. In doing so, they create cohesion through a view that they are 
victims of intolerance.
23
 This has manifested itself through the use of an “us vs. them” rhetorical 
strategy, which President Bush implemented enthusiastically when speaking on issues of 
terrorism. This language can be difficult to counter, as we can see when looking at Sen. John 
Kerry’s response. He was torn between the interests of the Democratic Party’s most loyal voting 
blocs and some of its best fundraisers. Yet his response seemed to fully please no one. Kerry 
chose a nuanced position, which supported both civil unions and Constitutional amendments to 
state constitutions to outlaw same-sex marriage.  
President Bush learned the importance of the Evangelical community while working with 
his father, George H.W. Bush on the 1988 Presidential campaign, where one of his roles was to 
act as a liaison between the faith community and the campaign.
24
 The elder Bush had a difficult 
time personally connecting with leaders of the faith community. This was partly due to the fact 
that he was not openly spiritual.
25
 As the liaison to the faith community, the younger Bush was 
able to introduce himself to faith leaders and prove to them that he was deeply entrenched in the 
evangelical lifestyle.  
The elder Bush did not necessarily connect with the Evangelical community, who 
recognized his dedication to pragmatism versus commitment to conservative dogma.
26
 The 
Christian Conservative community is characterized by its world view that there is good and evil 
                                                 
22
 (Rove, 2010) pg. 158 
23
 (Burack, 2008) pg. 10-11 
24
 (Hook, 2004) 
25
 (Gilgoff, 2007) 
26
 (Gilgoff, 2007) 
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in the world, a view not shared by pragmatists like George H.W. Bush who made many of his 
governing decisions based on his desire to find consensus and get the United States out of debt.
27
 
George W. Bush, as a born-again Christian, understood this world view and went with it, as we 
can see from his reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks. He made a very clear statement that 
you are “either with us or against us.”28 This rhetoric makes sense to the evangelical community, 
and was a strategy employed by the Bush-Cheney campaign to speak to them without alienating 
non-religious voters.
29
 
Same-sex marriage had long been a controversial issue in the Evangelical Christian 
community. The community rallied around the issue in the summer of 2003, when Don 
Wildmon, founder of the American Family Association held a summit of evangelical leaders.
30
 
As the founder and President of the American Family Association, Wildmon had spearheaded 
the efforts of the evangelical community “to inform, motivate, and equip God's people to take 
action on issues that threaten to undermine and destroy the traditional family and the Judeo-
Christian values upon which our nation was founded,” especially focusing on the media’s role in 
society.
31
 James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, and Sandy Rios, president of 
Concerned Women for America, along with other leaders of the evangelical community attended 
the summit. The gathering occurred at a time when it appeared that the evangelical community 
had been successful in electing politicians, yet the community was still disappointed at the speed 
of progress towards their goals.
32
 This meeting allowed movement leaders to refocus around 
                                                 
27
 (Gilgoff, 2007) 
28
 (Bush, Speech to a Joint Session of Congress, 2001) 
29
 (Burack, 2008)  
30
 (Gilgoff, 2007) pg. 139-140 
31
 (American Family Association) 
32
 (O'Keefe, 2003) 
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issues which could be successful in the 21
st
 century. The group settled upon the issue of same-
sex marriage.  
The summer 2003 summit was able to look ahead and anticipate that the threat of 
legalized same-sex marriage had the potential to motivate conservative voters. This gathering of 
conservative political activists united behind the concern that same-sex marriage could be 
legalized through the judiciary, the branch of government that had previously galvanized the 
evangelical community (i.e., legalizing abortion and outlawing school pray).
33
 Collectively, these 
political activists decided to focus on the issue of gay marriage in order to reignite the 
evangelical, Christian Right.
34
 That decision made same-sex marriage a natural focus of the Bush 
campaign to turn out Christian Right voters on Election Day. The Evangelical community’s 
broad support for the issue allowed for the Bush campaign to count on the development of a 
grassroots campaign, requiring them to invest few resources to drive this group of voters to the 
polls.
35
    
 
Why Same-Sex Marriage? 
The Bush campaign determined very early that the 2004 election would be more about 
turning out the base than appealing to undecided voters. As a result, they didn’t change much of 
their messaging from the 2000 campaign and instead delved further into the issues which would 
be most likely to draw out base voters. Same-sex marriage was not necessarily an obvious choice 
as a domestic issue calling card, yet it was an issue which would bring out the Republican base 
and motivate fundraising, while driving a wedge between the Democratic Party base. Ken 
Mehlman, 2004 Bush campaign manager, and Matthew Dowd, chief strategist, both identified 
                                                 
33
 (Gilgoff, 2007) pg. 140 
34
 (Gilgoff, 2007) pg. 140-141 
35
 (Green, Rozell, & Wilcox, 2006) pg. 13  
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same-sex marriage as an issue which would turn out base voters and motivate fundraising, but 
would not turnout “soft” conservative voters, who did not necessarily identify with a 
conservative stance on social issues.
36
  
After the  January 27 New Hampshire primary, Gallup had Bush leading prospective 
Democratic opponents on issues related to security, but not on any other domestic political issue. 
The same poll found that Iraq and other security issues were considered to be the third and fourth 
most important issue to voters when considering who to vote for.
37
 It is very difficult to win an 
election if voters do not agree with you on the issues. Yet, a Gallup Poll from February 25, 2004, 
found that 51% of all voters supported an amendment to the Constitution which would define 
marriage as between a man and a woman. More specifically, 65% of self-identified 
Conservatives and 66% of self-identified Republicans supported such an amendment. These poll 
results tell us that the issue did in fact resonate with Bush’s base.38 The Gallup Poll shows us that 
a strategic political decision to bring up the issue of same-sex marriage had the potential to turn 
out voters, and give Bush a winning domestic issue.  
The fact that Bush mostly reused his domestic agenda from the 2000 campaign 
contributed to his lack of winning domestic issues, a departure from a traditional re-election 
tactic of running on ones record. This is very clear when we look at the issues of Social Security 
privatization, increasing faith-based government initiatives, and decreasing dependence on 
foreign energy sources. Bush used the same language to address both issues in his 2000 and 2004 
campaigns.
39
 Though Bush was able to create the White House Office of Faith-Based Initiatives, 
pass Medicare reform, and the No Child Left Behind legislation, he continued to focus on 
                                                 
36
 (The Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2006) 104-105 
37
 (Gallup & Newport, 2006) pg. 34-35 
38
 (Gallup & Newport, 2006) pg. 85-87 
39
 (Kornblut, 2004)  
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domestic issues that he had  four years to address. The issue of same-sex marriage provided an 
avenue to address an issue that was not part of the conversation in 2000 and differentiate himself 
from the Democratic candidate.  
The November 2003 Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling in Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health gave the Bush campaign the opportunity to bring up the issue. Bush first 
mentioned same-sex marriage on February 24, 2004, during a speech which called for a 
Constitutional Amendment to define marriage as between a man and a woman.
40
 This speech, 
given from the Roosevelt Room of the White House, was a delayed response to the 
Massachusetts ruling which gave the Massachusetts Legislature 180 days to begin granting 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. This speech was the first time since the passage of the 
Federal Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 that same-sex marriage was addressed on a national 
stage.
41
 The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling served as a wake-up call for conservative 
voters.
42
  
  
Why it works in Ohio 
 Ohio in 2004 can certainly be classified as a swing state. Both campaigns saw Ohio as a 
potential battleground state coming into the 2004 Presidential election.
43
 Between January 21, 
2001 and May 4, 2004 President Bush visited the state 12 times, while Senator Kerry visited the 
state nine times.
44
 The 2000 Presidential election was very close in Ohio, and ultimately decided 
by 165,019 votes.
45
 This cemented Ohio’s position as a swing state, ensuring both campaigns 
                                                 
40
 (Bush, A Call for a Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage, 2004) 
41
 (Rauch, 2004) 
42
 (Rove, 2010) 374 
43
 (The Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2006) 196-7 
44
 (Welcome to Ohio --and the heart of the electin battle, 2004) 
45
 (Ohio Secretary of State's Office, 2008) 
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would spend a lot of time and resources in pursuit of the states’ 20 Electoral College votes. 
Finding one issue that could motivate a small number of voters who either had not voted in 2000 
or who chose to change their party vote could be the difference between winning or losing the 
2004 Presidential election.  
The economy is a particular important issue during election years. James Campbell 
theorizes that there are three key areas which decide elections, “the public’s opinion about the 
candidates at the outset of the campaign, the growth in the election year economy, and 
incumbency.”46 Clearly, President Bush already had incumbency, giving him a strong platform 
from which to begin the campaign. Exit polls revealed that Bush was a relatively polarizing 
figure. When asked how Bush was handling his job, 53 percent of Ohio voters approved of his 
job performance. These voters overwhelmingly (93 percent) voted to re-elect President Bush. 
Further, 89 percent of Ohio voters decided who they would be voting for more than one week 
before the election. Of those voters, 53 percent voted for President Bush.
47
 
Campbell further elaborates on the importance of the economy by looking to the recent 
past to find that, in the past 100 years, very few incumbent Presidents have been re-elected 
during times of economic downturn.
48
 Nationwide, in 2004, the economy was slowly improving, 
yet the Bush presidency had not been good for Ohio’s economy. Approximately 250,000 jobs 
were lost, while a poll of residents found that only 40% of Ohioans approved of Bush’s handling 
of the economy during his first term.
49
 The United States Bureau of Economic Analysis reports 
that between 1998 and 2004, Ohio’s per capita income as a percent of the United States per 
                                                 
46
 (Campbell J. E., Why Bush Won the Presidential Election of 2004: Incumbency, Ideology, Terrorism, and 
Turnout, 2005) 
47
 (National Election Pool) 
48
 (Campbell J. E., The American Campaign: U.S. Presidential Campaigns and the National Vote, 2008) pg 126-139 
49
 (Kahn, 2004) 
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capita income declined from 97% to approximately 93%.
50
 Ohioans were making less money 
than the average American and their earning power was continuing to decline during President 
Bush’s first term. Further, Ohio’s largest industry is durable goods manufacturing, a sector of the 
national economy that was hit especially hard during the early 2000s.
51
  
 Overall, Bush’s campaign chose to emphasize their position on the war on terror and Iraq. 
We can see this when looking at Paul Abramson, John Aldrich and David Rohde’s study of the 
2004 Presidential Election. They found that President Bush mentioned terrorism, Iraq, and the 
military 52 times in stump speeches between March and November 2004, more than any topic.
52
 
Senator Kerry only mentioned terrorism, Iraq, and the military 28 times, instead choosing to 
focus on the economy. In Ohio, Bush needed an issue which would both distract and energize 
voters. Same-sex marriage was just the issue because it allowed voters to stop focusing on their 
wallets and consider moral issues. In a sense, same-sex marriage encouraged voters who were 
hurting economically to redirect their attention away from the economy.  
  
Issue I 
The ballot language for State Issue 1 reads as follows:  
Be it Resolved by the People of the State of Ohio: 
That the Constitution of the State of Ohio be amended by adopting a section to be 
designated as Section 11 of Article XV thereof, to read as follows: 
Article XV, Section 11. Only a union between one man and one woman may be a 
marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and 
its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of 
                                                 
50
 (U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008) 
51
 (U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008) 
52
 (Abramson, Aldrich, & Rohde, 2005) 
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unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or 
effect of marriage. 
 
 The ballot language for State Issue one was submitted by the Ohio Campaign to Protect 
Marriage (OCPM), an organization affiliated with Focus on the Family. The group was created 
by Phil Burress, a Cincinnati-based community organizer who has spent the past 25 years 
working to rid the area of sex-related businesses including porn distributors and strip clubs.
53
 
The campaign’s efforts began in response to the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling in the 
Goodridge case.
54
 Yet Burress had been aware of the possibility of legalized same-sex marriage 
since late 1995. Since then, he has been a driving force in nationwide efforts to outlaw same-sex 
marriage, helping to encourage lawmakers to pass the 1996 Federal Defense of Marriage Act.
55
 
OCPM was co-chaired by Rev. KZ Smith of Corinthian Baptist Church, a predominatly black 
Cincinnati area mega-church,
56
 and Lori Viars, executive director of Family First PAC, a 
Lebanon, Ohio based conservative political action committee focused on providing money and 
support to conservative candidates.
57
 
 The organization needed 323,000 signatures from registered voters in order to reach the 
ballot in November 2004. At first, they succeeded in collecting 400,000, 30 percent of which 
were disqualified by Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell for being from unregistered voters. 
The campaign was then able to collect an additional 144,000 signatures in order to get the issue 
on the ballot.
58
 They gathered these signatures in less than 90 days.
59
 It is difficult to collect the 
                                                 
53
 (Clark, 2002) 
54
 (Foust, 2004) 
55
 (Dao, 2004) 
56
 (Corinthian Baptist Church, 2008) 
57
 (Family First PAC, 2008) 
58
 (Foust, 2004) 
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number of signatures necessary to make it onto the ballot under any circumstances. Meeting this 
deadline in three months is a clear indicator of the level of organization the campaign had. 
OCPM proactively recruited members and supporters. A survey of Columbus area 
churches shows that 67.2 percent of churches were familiar with OCPM. They were the second 
most known organization associated with Issue 1, second only to the Christian Coalition of Ohio, 
an organization with a much longer history of organizing Ohioans around social conservative 
issues. We can see this as a sample of their advocacy throughout the rest of the state. They 
focused on obtaining signatures from churches and religious organizations, in the process 
cultivating a database of 1.5 million conservative voters, accounting for more than 10 percent of 
Ohio’s population.60 OCPM also registered approximately 54,500 new voters, while conducting 
petition drives at churches.
61
  
The campaign for Issue 1 learned from the mistakes of similar campaigns when crafting 
the language of the amendment. Specifically, we can look to the 1992 marriage amendment 
passed in Colorado, which was the subject of the 1996 Supreme Court ruling in Romer v. Evans. 
In 1992, Colorado voters approved an amendment to their Constitution which made it illegal to 
pass civil rights protection laws for the LGBT community and repealed any already passed piece 
of legislation which provided protection based on sexual orientation. Like Ohio’s Issue 1, 
Colorado’s Issue 2 was a citizen’s initiative.62 The United States Supreme Court struck down 
Colorado’s amendment in 1996, when a majority of the Court found that laws could not 
explicitly exclude a class of people from protection under the law.
63
 
                                                                                                                                                             
59
 (Dao, 2004) 
60
 (Dao, 2004) 
61
 (Foust, 2004) 
62
 (Herman, 2000) pg. 150 
63
 (D'Emilio, 2000) pg. 41 
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Colorado’s Issue 2 also represented the first time the Evangelical Christian community 
mobilized against same-sex marriage.
64
 James Dobson, founder and then-President of the 
conservative Focus on the Family organization advocated for the passage of the Amendment on 
his radio show.  As in Ohio, support for the Amendment originated in a central location 
(Colorado Springs, where Focus on the Family was based) which was relatively separate from 
the politics of the rest of the state.
65
 Evangelical community support made passage of Issue 2 
possible.
66
 Issue 2 passed with 53 percent of the vote, surprising political observers. Supporters  
framed the issue as banning giving “special rights” to the LGBT community versus providing for 
equal rights. Those who regularly attended church were more likely to believe that the LGBT 
community wanted “special rights.”67 
 Framers of Ohio’s Issue 1 language saw that language specifically banning protection of 
a class of people would be considered unconstitutional. As a result, the language of Issue 1 is 
significantly different. Instead of limiting the rights of a group of people, it seeks to define 
marriage as between one man and one woman. The Romer decision did not address this wording, 
allowing the amendment to make it to the ballot without argument. Romer made it clear that 
whole groups of people could not be excluded from protection under the law. Yet the legacy of 
anti-sodomy laws, which were not found unconstitutional until the 2003 Supreme Court case of 
Lawrence v. Texas, was still present in legislation concerning the LGBT community.
68
    
 Two very different groups opposed Issue 1. The main opposition group to Issue 1 was 
Ohioans Protecting the Constitution. They were responsible for the language in opposition of the 
amendment which also appeared on the ballot. The group was lead by Alan Melamed, a 
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 (Gilgoff, 2007) pg. 34-36 
65
 (Ciruli Associates, May 2004) 
66
 (Gilgoff, 2007) 
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 (Ciruli Associates, May 2004) 
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 (D'Emilio, 2000) pg. 41 
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Cleveland attorney and political communications consultant. He and Ian James of the Strategy 
Network, were hired in May 2004 by Ohioans for Growth and Equality to lead the Ohioans 
Protecting the Constitution.
69
 Ohioans for Growth and Equality (OGE) is a political action 
organization founded at the beginning of the 2003-2004 Ohio Legislative Session, after the 
General Assembly debated the passage of a Defense of Marriage Amendment in the 2001-2001 
legislative session. OGE hired professional representation to maintain LGBT voices as a political 
presence in state government.
70
  
 Ohioans Protecting the Constitution faced several challenges during the campaign. First 
and foremost, they had a funding disadvantage to the pro-Issue 1 community. The Ohio 
Campaign to Protect Marriage raised approximately $1,194,808.
71
 $1,182,139 of this money was 
contributed by Citizens for Community Values, a Cincinnati-based conservative non-profit 
organization with direct times to Focus on the Family, the Family Research Council, and the 
American Family Foundation, three of the leading nation-wide conservative organizations.
72
 
OPC raised $942,421 from a much more diverse group of donors. Their largest donor was the 
Human Rights Campaign, followed closely by several independently wealthy individuals.
73
 
Having one central donor allowed OCPM to spend less time focusing on fundraising, a time 
consuming process.  
On the surface the fundraising difference does not appear too extreme, yet further 
analysis proves otherwise. 99.9 percent of OCPM’s money came from in-state sources, 
compared to 49.9 percent of OPC’s money.74 Further, the fact that the majority of OCPM’s 
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 (Resnick, Gay People's Chronicle, 2004) 
70
 (Ohioans for Growth and Equality) 
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funding came from a single, well connected source, indicates that they probably had to do less 
work to raise the funds. This, combined with the fact that the conservative community could 
draw support from a well established, statewide network of churches meant that they needed less 
money to reach more people. Ohio’s LGBT community is much smaller and has less political 
influence than Ohio’s evangelical community. As a result, OPC would have had to spend more 
to get their message out and build a grassroots network. A thriving field operation never 
materialized, due to a lack of funds.
75
 
 The second component of the anti-Issue 1 community was pro-business Republicans and 
corporate interests who thought that the amendment would be bad for business. The coalition 
behind the OPC was a bi-partisan coalition, including Log Cabin Republicans national board 
chair Bill Brownson and David Caldwell, the organizer of Cleveland Heights, Ohio’s domestic 
partner registry.
76
 Then Governor Bob Taft, along with then Senators Mike DeWine and George 
Voinovich, and Attorney General Jim Petro, all Republicans, wrote an editorial in the Cincinnati 
Enquirer explaining that they opposed Issue 1 because it would be bad for Ohio’s economy.77 
Several major Ohio corporations supported their argument that many companies in Ohio already 
provided domestic partner benefits. Such a restrictive amendment could also potentially impact 
non-married, heterosexual couples. Further, they argued that the amendment was unnecessary 
due to the passage of Ohio’s Defense of Marriage Act earlier that year.  
We can also see the impact of the business community when looking at OPC’s 
fundraising. One of their largest donor’s was Nationwide Mutual Insurance. The Columbus-
based insurance company donated $20,000 to OPC, as did Abigail Wexner, wife of Limited 
Brands CEO Les Wexner. Yet the OPC campaign never fully utilized potential support from the 
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business community. The campaign never tapped into the bipartisan support to create a field 
operation.
78
 The lack of a grassroots field operation, combined with a lack of funds, meant that it 
was much more difficult to get the anti-Issue 1 message out.  
 Overall, Issue 1 provided a strange political opportunity for both the Republican and 
Democratic Parties. The same-sex marriage issue allowed the Republican Party to speak to 
religious African-American voters who identified as Democrats but were more socially 
conservative. It also allowed the Democratic Party to reach out to Republican voters 
disillusioned with the growing importance of social conservatives to the Republican voting bloc.  
 
Ohio as a Battleground 
Bush’s 2000 election victory was anything but easy for the Bush-Cheney campaign team. 
Immediately after their victory, the trio of Campaign Manager Ken Mehlman, Political Strategist 
Karl Rove and Chief Campaign Strategist Matthew Dowd looked at the voter turnout and results 
from the election and determined that the 2004 election would be about turning out base voters, 
not necessarily wooing independents.
79
 In his book Courage and Consequence, Rove indicated 
that gay marriage was not necessarily an issue the campaign originally thought to pursue. 
Instead, they pursued the issue after it became apparent that it was an issue which could both 
show how President Bush could compassionately solve a controversial issue and reveal how 
indecisive the “Left” was.80 Tapping into the evangelical community was one easy way to 
increase voter turnout and help Bush win re-election. The combination of the results of the 2000 
Presidential election, the emergence of Issue 1, and the growing importance of the evangelical 
community ensured that Ohio would be a battleground in the 2004 Presidential election.  
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Ohio has a unique political geography that distinguishes it from many other states. There 
are 9 media markets wholly in the state and another three from other states with viewership in 
Ohio.
81
 This represents a challenge when campaigning in the state. In order to reach the 
maximum number of voters a campaign must spread its time and resources over a very large 
area. Yet it also represents an opportunity for grassroots organizers to take political action 
without informing their competition. The Issue 1 campaign began in Cincinnati and focused 
much of its early efforts in southern Ohio. As a result, LGBT rights activists in northern Ohio 
were not aware that the effort was as serious as it was until July 2004, relatively late in the 
game.
82
 
The 2004 election showed us that same-sex marriage was an issue which could galvanize 
grassroots efforts. The Bush-Cheney campaign anticipated that it would be a very close election, 
and therefore, put an added emphasis on establishing a good field campaign which could turnout 
supporters. The Kerry-Edwards campaign recognized that the result of the election would likely 
come down to how Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida voted. As a result, both campaigns focused 
their resources on these three states.
83
  
In Ohio, Republicans had been developing a get out the vote strategy since 2000, and 
used the 2002 mid-term election to test it. Their strategy was built around person to person 
networking and outreach.
84
 The Bush-Cheney campaign team went so far as to use church 
membership directories to target potential voters.
85
 The importance both campaigns placed on 
their get out the vote efforts is indicated by the amount of money they spent on their efforts. The 
Bush-Cheney campaign spent approximately $125 million, or about three times more money 
                                                 
81
 (Abramson, Aldrich, & Rohde, 2005) 
82
 (Biliczky, 2004) 
83
 (The Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2006) pg. 196 
84
 (The Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2006) 
85
 (Moore & Slater, 2006) pg. 114-115 
23 
 
than was allocated for voter turnout in 2000.
86
 The Kerry campaign budgeted more than twice as 
much for voter turnout, or approximately $60 million, than the Gore campaign had in 2000. They 
were also aided by money and resources from influential labor unions.
87
 Union support is 
especially important in Ohio, a manufacturing state. Exit polls indicate that 17 percent of Ohio 
voters in 2004 were members of a union, three percent more than nationwide.
88
 
Issue 1 supporters replicated the Republican strategy. The Ohio Campaign to Protect 
Marriage used person to person networking through the religious community to create a database 
of supporters, creating an incredibly strong, grassroots field network. OCPM’s grassroots 
network closely resembled the grassroots network of evangelicals created by the Bush-Cheney 
campaign. In contrast, the anti-Issue 1 campaign, with was a much broader coalition of interests, 
was never able to unify and create a cohesive message. The inherent nature of the religious 
community gave Issue 1 supporters and Republicans an advantage in establishing a field 
network. This became a huge strategic advantage when trying to turn out supporters on Election 
Day. As a result, we can say that having Issue 1 on the ballot was a strategic advantage for the 
Bush-Cheney campaign because it created a unified group of supporters who would already be 
going to the polls. All the Bush campaign had to do was ensure that supporters of Issue 1 
understood President Bush’ stance on the subject, a stance he had clearly defined.  
 
Did Issue 1 Have an Impact on the Election? 
 Ultimately, Issue 1 passed with 61.71 percent of the vote, or 3,329,335 votes in favor 
compared to 2,065,462 opposed,
89
 considerably more votes than President Bush received. Bush 
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received 50.81 percent of the vote, or 2,859,768 votes, compared to 48.71 percent of the vote, or 
2,741,167 votes for Senator Kerry.
90
 In total, 233,111 more people voted in the Presidential 
election than voted for Issue 1. Yet Issue 1 passed with overwhelming bi-partisan support, as it 
passed by 469,567 more votes than President Bush received. This means that supporters of Issue 
1 were able to reach voters not generally associated with the Republican Party.  
Issue 1, Ohio SoS 
Yes No Total 
3,329,335 2,065,462 5,394,797 
President, Ohio Sos 
Bush Kerry Total 
2,859,768 2,741,167 5,600,935 
  
We can look to the National Election Pool to better understand who voted and for what 
reasons. The National Election Pool (NEP) is a joint effort between ABC, CBS, CNN, FOX, 
NBC and the Associated Press. Collectively, the news outlets hired Edison Media Research and 
Mitofsky International to conduct exit polls following General Elections.
91
 Following the 2004 
Presidential election, the media widely reported that the deciding issue had been “moral values.” 
This is due to the results of the NEP exit poll results, which found that nationwide, 22 percent of 
voters listed “moral values” as the most important factor when deciding for whom to vote. 
Voters who listed moral values as the most important issue voted for President Bush 80 percent 
of the time and Senator Kerry 18 percent of the time. “Economy/jobs” came in a close second, 
for 20 percent of voters selecting it as the most important issue. Voters who listed the 
economy/jobs as the most important issue voted for President Bush 18 percent of the time and 
Senator Kerry 80 percent of the time.
92
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Issue, 
Nationwide Total Bush Kerry 
Moral Values 22% 80% 18% 
Economy/Jobs 20% 18% 80% 
Terrorism 19% 86% 14% 
Iraq 15% 26% 73% 
Health Care 8% 23% 77% 
Taxes 5% 57% 43% 
Education  4% 26% 73% 
 
According to NEP, Ohio’s exit poll results were somewhat different from the national 
averages. Voters selected moral values as the most important issue 23 percent of the time and the 
economy/jobs 24 percent of the time. Ohio voters that selecting moral values outpaced the 
national average, and voted for President Bush 85 percent of the time, while only voting for 
Senator Kerry 14 percent of the time. Ohio voters that selected the economy/jobs as the most 
important issue again outpaced the national average, voting for Senator Kerry 83 percent of the 
time and President Bush 17 percent of the time.
93
  
Issue, Ohio Total Bush Kerry 
Moral Values 23% 62% 38% 
Economy/Jobs 24% 17% 83% 
Terrorism 17% 90% 10% 
Iraq 13% 28% 72% 
Health Care 5% 25% 75% 
Taxes 6% 62% 38% 
Education 5% 32% 66% 
 
                                                 
93
 (National Election Pool) 
26 
 
 The term moral values may be a bit misleading. The same poll also asked voters what the 
most important quality they looked at when deciding who to vote for. When given the choice 
between “cares about people,” “religious faith,” “honesty,” “strong leader,” “intelligent,” “will 
bring change,” and “clear stand on issue,” voters only selected religious faith ten percent of the 
time. This made it the sixth most important quality their candidate possessed. Voters who 
selected religious faith overwhelmingly voted for President Bush, 95 percent to 5 percent.
94
 
Looking at both poll questions gives us a clearer understanding of what Ohio voters were 
thinking when they voted. A Pew Research Center poll from after the election found that voters 
who selected moral values as the most important factor in their decision had very different 
opinions as to what constituted moral values.
95
 Moral values had several meanings for voters in 
Ohio. An article in the San Francisco Chronicle published before the election spoke with Canton, 
Ohio voters. Specifically, the article spoke with the manager of an employment agency who 
noted that many of the city’s unemployed were willing to overlook the problems with the 
economy because of President Bush’s personal faith.96 The broadness of the term moral values 
allowed individuals to interpret it in many ways. Making the assumption that voters selected 
moral values because of same-sex marriage jumps to a conclusion without proper evidence. 
We can see the effect of Issue 1 when looking at the vote of Ohio’s African-American 
community. In Ohio, the African-American community represented 10 percent of the electorate 
in 2004 versus 11 percent of the electorate nationwide.  In 2000, President Bush garnered seven 
percent more of the African-American community than he did in 2004. Bush gained 16 percent 
of the African-American vote compared to Kerry’s 84 percent share. This is a bigger increase 
than Bush experienced nationwide, where he gained two percent more of the vote, bringing his 
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share of the African-American vote to 11 percent.
 97
 The increase in Bush’s share of the Ohio 
African-American community is statistically significant. The combination of increased targeting 
of the African-American community by conservative organizers of Issue 1 and the differing 
social values of their community in comparison to the Democratic Party, meant that the African-
American community was one that had the potential to change sides. The Bush campaign was 
able to take advantage of this, and gain a larger share of the vote.  
Bush Voter Turnout, National Election Pool 
  
Black White 
Ohio US Ohio US 
2000 9 9 55 54 
2004 16 11 56 58 
 
Issue 1 also increased voter turnout amongst individuals who attend church on a regular 
basis. 14 percent of Ohio voters stated that they attended church more than weekly, 69 percent of 
these voters cast their vote for President Bush. President Bush increased his vote share of this 
community by 17 percent.
 98
 This is one area where Issue 1 certainly had a direct impact on the 
Presidential election results. As already noted, the evangelical community had been targeted by 
the Bush-Cheney campaign as one base constituency where an increase in voter turnout would be 
both possible and helpful. Both the Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage and the Bush-Cheney 
campaign directly targeted members of churches. The Bush-Cheney campaign used church 
membership directories to target potential voters.
99
 The OCPM used the same tactic, developing 
a 1.5 million person database from membership directories.
100
 This indicates that potential voters 
were contacted by both campaigns. Increased contact, especially by a single-issue campaign that 
                                                 
97
 (National Election Pool), (National Election Pool)  
98
 (National Election Pool) 
99
  (Moore & Slater, 2006) pg. 114-115 
100
 (Dao, 2004) 
28 
 
supported a candidate higher up the ticket increases the likelihood that voters will consider your 
position.  
Vote by Church Attendance, Ohio 
  
Total 
(%) 
Bush 
(%) 
Kerry 
(%) 
More than 
Weekly 14 69 31 
Weekly 26 64 36 
Monthly 15 50 50 
A Few times 
a Year 28 40 60 
Never 14 35 63 
 
Ohio’s 2004 election also saw an incredible increase in turnout and voter registration. In 
total, there were 441,271 more Ohioans registered to vote in 2004 than in 2000. As noted, the 
Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage alone registered 54,000 new voters. In Franklin County, 
churches were incredibly active in registering their members, with 80 percent of Roman Catholic 
churches and 59 percent of Evangelical Protestant churches involved in voter registration.
101
 
There were 102,000 new voters registered in Franklin County alone.
102
 Yet Issue 1 was probably 
not the largest motivator for new registration. Approximately 15 percent of Ohio voters had 
never voter before. We can assume these voters were newly registered. Of these new voters, 46 
percent voted for President Bush and 54 percent voted for Senator Kerry.
103
 We can attribute this 
difference to the emphasis each campaign put on registering new voters. While the Bush-Cheney 
campaign still recognized the importance of new voters, their focus was on turning out their 
base.
104
 The Kerry campaign and associated Democrat leaning organizations worked hard to 
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register new voters in order to increase voter turnout in their favor.
105
 These newly registered 
voters were often minorities and young people, two groups of people often affected by voter 
suppression techniques.  
 This strategy appeared to work for the Bush-Cheney campaign. 34 percent of Ohio voters 
self-identified as Conservatives. Of that 34 percent, 87 percent voted for President Bush, an 
increase of 5 percent from the 2000 Presidential Election. Only 19 percent of Ohio voters self-
identified as Liberal in 2004.
106
 Though President Bush lost 2 percent of these voters, the 
difference was not enough to change the outcome of the election. We can also see this reflected 
when voter party identification. 35 percent of Ohio voters self-identified as Democrats, while 40 
percent self-identified as Republicans, and the remaining 25 percent self-identifying as 
Independents. President Bush managed to increase his share of the Republican voters by 5 
percent, meaning 94 percent of Republicans voted for him. He maintained his support amongst 
Democrats, and lost support from Independent voters, gaining 40 percent of their vote, or 14 
percent less than he received in 2000.
107
 Focusing on motivating the base turned out to be a 
winning strategy for the Bush-Cheney campaign in Ohio. Issue 1 was an issue which motivated 
Evangelical base voters. It is clear that Issue 1 impacted the result of the Presidential Election 
when we look at the election from this perspective.  
  
Election Irregularities  
 It is also important to consider what role election irregularities played, when considering 
if Issue 1 had any impact on the 2004 Presidential election in Ohio. Following the election, the 
House of Representatives, led by Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), conducted an extensive 
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investigation into election proceedings in Ohio. They found that the majority of the problems 
were caused by or due to Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell who, while performing his duties 
as chief election regulator, also served as the co-chairman of President Bush’s Ohio re-election 
campaign. The Conyers report breaks the election irregularities down into three broad areas: 
first, the collective actions of Secretary of State Blackwell, the Republican Party, and election 
officials resulted in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of many minority and Democratic 
voters; second, there were problems on Election Day that caused votes to go unaccounted; and 
third, following the election, there was very little effort to investigate irregularities or ensure the 
election was free and fair.
108
 It is not possible to accurately determine if Issue 1 truly had an 
impact as a result of these widespread problems in Ohio voting.  
 Kenneth Blackwell and the Secretary of State’s Office made several controversial 
decisions leading up to the election. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was passed in 2002 to 
ensure that the controversy of the 2000 Presidential Election would not be repeated.
109
 HAVA 
was intended to allow the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to providing funding to states 
in order to update their voting hardware, i.e., swapping punch ballot machines for electronic 
voting machines. Blackwell did not provide an accounting of how these funds were spent.
110
  
The new voting machines were also not allocated appropriately. There were not enough 
machines in predominatly Democratic and minority districts. One very stark example of this 
comes from Franklin County. Following the election, the Washington Post conducted an 
extensive investigation into voting irregularities in Franklin County. Franklin County saw 
102,000 new voters register to vote. Many of these new voters, according to State Senator Ray 
Miller’s (D-Columbus) testimony in front of the House Judiciary Committee, were African 
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American.
111
 Yet county election officials did not take this into consideration when determining 
how to allocate resources. As a result, many heavily minority Franklin County precincts did not 
have enough voting machines to handle the new voters. In fact, several precincts had fewer 
voting machines in the general election than they had in the primary. This created long lines, 
which caused voters to wait for extended periods of time. As a result, as many as 15,000 voters 
were disenfranchised in Columbus alone.
112
 These problems were caused by the actions (or 
inaction) of the Ohio Secretary of State and county boards of election.  
On Election Day there were several problems which caused votes to go unaccounted. The 
Election Protection Commission reported to the Judiciary Committee that there were over 3,300 
incidents of voting irregularities, including problems of intimidation and misinformation, 
machine irregularities, and official misconduct. As a consequence of these problems, the 
Conyers Report indicates that there were serious violations to the Voting Rights Act which were 
not investigated by the Secretary of State’s Office. These problems created an atmosphere where 
minority voters especially were disenfranchised. The majority of the Election Day violations 
occurred in areas with large minority populations.
113
  
There were also irregularities in Ohio’s post-election actions, specifically in the handling 
of provisional ballots and recounts. Blackwell enforced a new rule for provisional ballots, 
deciding that provisional ballots must be cast in the correct precinct. This was a change from 
tradition, where individuals would be able to cast a provisional ballot in the proper county 
regardless of the precinct.
114
 The guidelines issued also did not provide information regarding 
how to count these provisional ballots. This resulted in many provisional ballots being tossed 
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out. For example, Cuyahoga County ruled 8,099 out of 24,472 provisional ballots to be 
invalid.
115
 Blackwell also failed to provide comprehensive guidelines for conducting recounts. 
As a result, recounts across the state were not conducted in a uniform fashion. These ballots were 
often not treated in a uniform manner, with no basic decision on the state-level as to how ballots 
should be stored.
116
  
 
Conclusion 
 The 2004 Presidential election in Ohio was groundbreaking on many fronts. More 
Ohioans voted than in any election in Ohio history.
117
 When we look at why, we can conclude 
that a combination of factors created an atmosphere where Ohio’s importance to the overall 
Presidential Election was greatly exaggerated. The knowledge that the overall election would be 
decided by two to three percentage points nationwide meant that Ohio’s 20 Electoral College 
votes became crucial. As a result, both the Bush-Cheney campaign and the Kerry-Edwards 
campaign increased the time and resources they poured into the state. Both campaigns knew that 
winning would require getting as many of their supporters to the polls as possible, yet each took 
different paths to this shared goal. The Kerry-Edwards campaign focused their Ohio resources on 
registering new voters and wooing independents. The Bush-Cheney campaign concentrated their 
efforts on turning out their base.  
 While both campaigns were able to get people to the polls, the Bush-Cheney campaign 
was simply more successful. They were aided by having Issue 1 on the ballot. Issue 1 spoke 
directly to the concerns of the Evangelical, conservative Christian Right, a crucial member of 
President Bush’s base. This served as a motivating issue, which could ensure that the Bush-
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Cheney campaign strategy of turning out their base would work. It came with the added bonus of 
having an exceptionally well organized field network. The Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage 
was very well organized by people with many years of experience organizing similar 
conservative issue campaigns throughout Ohio. These organizers were able to capitalize on their 
institutional knowledge, and a statewide network of churches, which facilitated person-to-person 
advocacy for Issue 1. Though not necessarily working in concert, the Issue 1 campaign and the 
Bush-Cheney campaign ran very complimentary campaigns that were successful in motivating 
their base.  
 In comparison, the Kerry-Edwards campaign and the anti-Issue 1 movement were much 
less organized. On the surface, both campaigns had strategic advantages that could have changed 
the outcomes of both elections. In Ohio, Sen. Kerry had the distinct advantage of not being the 
incumbent during a difficult economic time. Yet he was unable to truly capitalize on the state of 
the Ohio economy because the Bush-Cheney campaign kept steering the conversation towards 
terrorism. By allowing the subject to be changed, the Kerry-Edwards campaign was unable to 
focus on issues they could win on. The Kerry-Edwards campaign was also unable to capitalize 
on any potential grassroots support from the anti-Issue 1 campaign, mostly due to the lack of a 
cohesive anti-Issue 1 effort. Ohioans Protecting the Constitution, the main anti-Issue 1 
organization, had the potential to generate bi-partisan support, as Republicans Bob Taft, George 
Voinovich, Mike DeWine, and Jim Petro all publicly came out against the issue. Corporations 
were vocal in their opposition to Issue 1 and the LGBT community had the ability to mobilize in 
major cities. Yet OPC was never able to capitalize on this in order to create a cohesive effort 
against Issue 1. They failed to capitalize on an issue which had the potential to motivate a new 
34 
 
set of voters. When we look at it from this angle, the Bush-Cheney campaign was able to use 
Issue 1, while the Kerry-Edwards campaign was not. 
 Both political parties were also able to use Issue 1 to reach a constituency they would not 
often reach, yet neither party was able to make lasting gains from this opportunity. Republicans 
were able to use Issue 1 to reach the African-American community, a traditionally Democratic 
voting bloc. Yet this did not last for two reasons: first, in 2006, Democratic candidate for 
Governor Ted Strickland, an ordained minister, was able to connect with both the African-
American community and many in the Evangelical community by relating through religion, and 
second, the 2008 Democratic candidate for President Barack Obama solidified the African-
American community’s support for the Democratic Party. It was possible for the Democratic 
Party to use Issue 1 to speak to fiscally conservative Republicans who did not agree with 
government advances into issues such as same-sex marriage. But the inability of the Democratic 
Party to organize a successful, cohesive campaign made this difficult, if not impossible.  
 Issue 1’s overall impact on the Presidential Election is by no means absolute. Instead, 
Issue 1 created opportunities for both parties to grow and turnout their supporters. Ultimately, we 
can see that Issue 1 ensured that a segment of base voters who might not necessarily be 
motivated to go to the polls had a specific reason to vote.  
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Appendix:  
Map 1: This map shows all the counties in Ohio and 10 major cities. Red indicates counties that 
voted Republican, while blue indicates counties that voted Democratic.  
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